We consider secret key generation by a pair of mobile nodes utilizing observations of their relative locations in the presence of a mobile eavesdropper. In our proposed algorithm, the legitimate node pair makes noisy observations of the relative locations of each other. Based on these observations, the nodes generate secret key bits via information reconciliation, data compression, and privacy amplification. We characterize a theoretically achievable secret key bit rate in terms of the observation noise variance at the legitimate nodes and the eavesdropper and show that the performance of our algorithm is comparable to the theoretical bounds. We also test our algorithm in a vehicular setting based on observations made using wireless beacon exchange between the legitimate nodes. To achieve this, we used TelosB wireless radios mounted on the sides of the vehicles on local roads and freeways. Note that our approach relies solely on distance reciprocity, and thus, it is not restricted to the use of wireless radios and can be used with other localization systems (e.g., infrared and ultrasound systems) as well. Overall, this study proves, via both information theoretic and practical analysis, that localization information provides a significant additional resource for secret key generation in mobile networks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
W E CONSIDER the generation of a common key in a pair of nodes, which move in R 2 (continuous space) according to a stochastic mobility model. We exploit the reciprocity of the distance between a given pair of locations, view the distance between the legitimate nodes as a common randomness shared by these nodes and utilize it to generate secret key bits using the ideas from source models of secrecy [1] .
Unlike the recent plethora of studies (see Section I-A for a brief list of related papers) that focuses on wireless channel reciprocity, a variety of technologies can be used for localization (e.g., ultrasound, infrared, lidar, radar, and wireless radios), which makes distance reciprocity an additional resource for generating secret key bits. Such versatility makes the key generation systems more robust since different technologies may have different capabilities that wireless RF does not have. Manuscript For instance, the narrow beamwidth of infrared systems would make them less susceptible to eavesdropping from different angles. Distance reciprocity is highly robust since the distance measured between any pair of points is identical, regardless of which point the measurement originates (e.g., when there is no line of sight or when different frequency bands are used each way). However, there are various challenges in obtaining reciprocal distance measurements.
To that end, we propose a key generation algorithm, in which the legitimate nodes use a three-stage key generation process: 1) In the first stage, they obtain observations regarding the sequence of distances between them over a period of time as they move in the area. The measurements can be obtained actively through the exchange of wireless radio, ultrasound, and infrared beacons or passively by processing existing video images, etc. The beacon signal may contain explicit information such as a time stamp, or the receiving node can extract other means of localization information by analyzing the angle of arrival, received signal strength, etc. The nodes perform localization based on the observations of distances and the statistics of the mobility model and obtain estimates of their relative locations with respect to each other. 2) In the second stage, the nodes communicate over the public channel to agree on an initial key based on their relative location estimates. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper also obtains some information correlated with the generated key. 3) In the final stage, the legitimate nodes perform universal data compression and privacy amplification on the initial key to obtain the final key.
The generated final key bits satisfy three quality measures: 1) reliability; 2) secrecy; and 3) randomness. For reliability, we show that the probability of mismatch between the keys generated by the legitimate nodes decays to 0 with increasing block length. In our attacker model, we consider a passive eavesdropper that overhears the exchanged beacons in the first phase and the public discussion in the third phase and tries to deduce the generated key based solely on these observations. The attacker can follow various mobility strategies in order to enhance its position statistically to reduce the achievable key rate (possibly to 0). We assume that the attacker does not actively interfere with the observation phase, e.g., by injecting jamming signals, etc., in order not to reveal its presence. For secrecy, we consider Wyner's notion, i.e., the rate at which mutual information on the key leaks to the eavesdropper, to be arbitrarily low. For randomness, the generated key bits have to be perfectly compressed, i.e., the entropy should be equal to the number of bits that it contains.
Next, we focus on information theoretic limits. Using a source model of secrecy [1] , we characterize the achievable secret key bit rate in terms of the observation noise parameters at the legitimate nodes and the eavesdropper under two different 0018-9545 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
cases of global location information (GLI): 1) no GLI, in which the nodes do not observe their global locations directly, and 2) perfect GLI, in which the nodes have perfect observation of their global locations, through a GPS device for example. While the bounds that we provide are general for a large set of observation statistics, we further investigate the scenario in which the observation noise is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian for all nodes: 1) First, we study the observation SNR asymptotics and show a phasetransition phenomenon for the key rate. In particular, we prove that the secret key rate grows unboundedly as the observation noise variance decays if the eavesdropper does not obtain the angle of arrival observations. Otherwise, it is not possible to increase the secret key rate beyond a certain limit. 2) Then, we provide an opportunistic modification to our algorithm, with the additional assumption that the eavesdropper mobility statistics are available at the legitimate nodes. 1 In this case, legitimate nodes exchange beacons only when they predict a geographic advantage over the eavesdropper. 3) We evaluate the theoretical performance numerically for a simple grid-type model, as a function of beacon power. We compare the bounds with our algorithm and show that our key generation algorithm achieves a key rate close to the theoretical lower bounds. We show that, with our opportunistic modification, nonzero key rates can be achieved even when the eavesdropper obtains better localization information on average (e.g., when the eavesdropper has multiple location sensors/antennas and better GLI). We also evaluate the performance for the case where the eavesdropper strategically changes its location to reduce the secret key rate. Specifically, we consider the strategy where the eavesdropper moves to the middle of its location estimates of the legitimate nodes. With this strategy, the eavesdropper can significantly reduce the secret key rate compared to the case where it follows a random mobility pattern, yet the key rate remains positive. Finally, we test our algorithm using real experimental measurements taken in a vehicular environment, where two vehicles, equipped with TelosB motes with omnidirectional wireless radios, cruise in local streets and freeways. We show that our algorithm achieves nonzero secret key rates at very low keymismatch rates even under extremely pessimistic settings, in which the attacker makes observations in the immediate vicinity of one of the legitimate nodes throughout the process and without any prior statistical model at the nodes on the mobility patterns. We also show that the generated key passes all the randomness tests in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) test suite [28] .
In summary, our main contribution is to illustrate that relative localization information can be used as an additional resource for secret key generation (see Section I-A for a comparison with related work). To that end, we did the following:
1) Analyze information theoretic limits, and show that arbitrarily large secret key rates can be attained when the adversary does not obtain any angle information. 2) Introduce and implement a secret key generation algorithm to illustrate that our idea can be realized in practice.
3) Evaluate the performance of our algorithm via simulations, and show that it is comparable to the information theoretic bounds on key capacity, i.e., the loss that we attain by implementing computationally feasible algorithms is not large. 4) Illustrate via real-world experiments in vehicular settings that our algorithm can be implemented using on-the-shelf devices without any modification on the physical layer, and demonstrate that provably secure keys can be generated even under extremely pessimistic settings. 5) Develop an opportunistic beacon exchange algorithm that achieves positive secrecy rates even when the adversary obtains better localization information on average. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that provides both theoretical and practical analyses on secret key generation via localization. Our system can be valuable in a number of possible applications, including intelligent transportation systems, tactical networks, mobile secure crowd sensing, wireless LANs, and Internet of things. We would like to emphasize that, in any application, our system based on localization and mobility does not have to be the only mechanism to generate secret key bits. Instead, its robustness puts our system in a position to play an excellent supporting role for other existing methods, particularly for key generation via wireless channel gains.
A. Related Work
The generation of a secret key from relative localization information can be categorized under source model of information theoretic secrecy, which studies the generation of secret key bits from common randomness observed by legitimate nodes. In his seminal paper [1] , Maurer showed that, if two nodes observe correlated randomness, then they can agree on a secret key through public discussion. He provided upper and lower bounds on the achievable secret key rates. Although the bounds have been improved later [2] , [3] , the secret key capacity of the source model, in general, is still an open problem. Despite this fact, the source model has been utilized in several different settings [4] - [6] .
There is a vast amount of literature on localization (see, e.g., [8] and [9] for wireless localization, [15] for infrared localization, and [16] for ultrasound localization). There has been some focus on secure localization and position-based cryptography [10]- [13] ; however, these works either consider key generation in terms of other forms of secrecy (i.e., computational secrecy) or fall short of covering a complete information theoretic analysis.
A similar line of work in wireless network secrecy considers channel identification [14] for secret key generation using wireless radios. Based on the channel reciprocity assumption, nodes at both ends experience the same channel, corrupted by independent noise. Therefore, nodes can use their channel magnitude and phase response observations to generate secret key bits from public discussion. The literature on channel identification-based secret key generation is vast. The authors of [20] - [25] study key generation with on-the-shelf devices, under the 802.11 development platform using a two-way radio signal exchange on the same frequency. Mathur et al. [27] , on the other hand, utilize the fact that fading is highly correlated on locations that are less than a half wavelength apart, instead of exploiting the reciprocity. Therefore, very close nodes can use public radio signals (e.g., frequency modulation (FM), television (TV), and Wi-Fi) to generate secret key bits.
In most of these works, the security analysis is based on the assumption that the channel gains are modeled as random processes that are independent of the distances between the nodes and are independent at locations that are more than a few wavelengths apart. While being appropriate for a non-line-ofsight and highly dynamic media, these models do not capture wireless propagation in environments where attenuation is a function of the propagation distance. In such environments, an attacker that has some localization capabilities will gain a statistical advantage by estimating the channel gains based on its distance observations. If the key generation process ignores this advantage, part of the key may be recovered by the attacker, and thus, the key cannot be perfectly secure. For instance, Jana et al. [21] focus on a scenario in which secret key bits are based on the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) and show that an eavesdropper that knows the location of the legitimate nodes can launch a mobility attack to force the legitimate nodes to generate deterministic key bits, by periodically blocking and unblocking their line of sight. Similarly, if the eavesdropper is close (less than a wavelength) to one of the legitimate nodes, then the eavesdropper will obtain correlated information [27]; therefore, the generated key will not be perfectly secure, and secrecy outage occurs. The practical applicability of exploiting channel reciprocity for secret key generation has also been questioned recently in [26] . It is shown that, particularly when the nodes have sufficient mobility, the eavesdropper's and the legitimate receiver's channels can be significantly correlated depending on the locations, which breaks the secrecy of the initial generated key.
On the other hand, our approach of key generation based on locations does not make such independence assumptions. We take into account the dependences in the locations of the legitimate nodes and the observations of the attacker with those of the legitimate nodes to provide provably security against a mobile eavesdropper with localization capability. Thus, the insights provided in this paper can also be valuable for the class of studies on key generation based on wireless channel reciprocity, as we show how one should capture a variety of capabilities of the attackers in finding the correct rate for the key and in designing the appropriate mechanisms to generate a truly secret key.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give the system model, and in Section III, we provide our key generation algorithm. In Section IV, we provide the general theoretical performance limits of key generation from localization. In Section V, we study the performance limits in detail for the case where the observation noise terms are additive i.i.d. Gaussian and propose our opportunistic beacon exchange algorithm. In Section VI, we apply our key generation algorithm to a vehicular setting. We conclude in Section VII. Several proofs and derivations are collected in the Appendix. Due to the page limitation, technical details of secondary importance are provided in our technical report [34] . A word about notation: We use [x] + = max(0, x), and . denotes the L2-norm. A brief list of variables used in the paper can be found in Table I. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Mobility Model
We consider a simple network consisting of two mobile legitimate nodes, called users 1 and 2, and a possibly mobile eavesdropper e. We divide time uniformly into n discrete slots. Let l j [i] ∈ L be the random variable that denotes the coordinates of the location of node j ∈ {1, 2, e} in slot i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where nodes are restricted to the field L ⊂ R 2 . We use the boldface notation l j = {l j [i]} n i=1 to denote the n-tuple location vectors for j ∈ {1, 2, e}. The distance between nodes 1 and 2 in slot i is d 12 
denote the sequence of distances between nodes (1, e) and nodes (2, e), respectively. We use the boldface notation d 12 , d 1e , d 2e for the n-tuple distance vectors. Note that, in any slot, the nodes form a triangle in R 2 , as depicted in Fig. 1 , where φ 12 [i], φ 21 [i], φ 1e [i], and φ 2e [i] denote the angles with respect to some coordinate axis. We assume that the distances d 12 [i], d 1e [i], d 2e [i] take values in the interval [d min d max ] since the nodes cannot be closer to each other than d min due to physical restrictions and they cannot be further than d max away from each other due to their limited communication range. We assume that the location vectors l 1 , l 2 , l e are ergodic processes. We will use the notation s Δ = [l 1 , l 2 , l e ] to summarize the state variables related to mobility in the system. Note that
B. Localization
At each time slot, there is a period in which the legitimate nodes obtain information about their relative position with respect to each other. As discussed in Section I-A, there are various methods to establish the localization information. In this paper, we will not treat these methods separately. We will simply assume that, during measurement period i, when node 1 transmits a beacon, nodes 2 and e obtain a noisy observation of d 12 [i] and d 1e [i], respectively. Let these observation bed 2 [i] and d 1e [i], respectively. Similarly, when node 2 follows up with a beacon, nodes 1 and e obtain the distance observationsd 1 [i] and d 2e [i], respectively. The nodes may also independently observe their global positions, e.g., through a GPS device. They may also observe the angle that they make with respect to each other if they are equipped with direction sensitive localizers (e.g., directional antennas in wireless localization). We consider two extreme cases on the GLI. 1) No GLI: The nodes do not have any knowledge of their global location. However, with the observations of both the beacons, the eavesdropper also obtains a noisy observationφ e [i] of the angle between the legitimate nodes. 2) Perfect GLI: Each node has perfect knowledge of its global location and a sense of orientation with respect to some coordinate plane as shown in Fig. 2 . In this case, nodes 1 and 2 obtain noisy observationsφ 1 ,φ 2 of the angle φ 12 . Similarly, node e obtains noisy observation φ 1e ,φ 2e of the angles φ 1e , φ 2e .
Let o j [i] denote the set of observations of the node during
The observations o j for each case are provided in Table II . We emphasize that the observations in each slot are obtained solely from the beacons exchanged during that particular slot. The nodes' final estimates of the distances depend also on the observations during other slots, due to predictable mobility patterns. 
C. Attacker Model
We assume that there exists a passive eavesdropper e, which does not transmit any beacons. However, node e can strategically change its location to obtain a geographical advantage against the legitimate nodes. Overall, we consider two strategies.
Random Mobility: The eavesdropper moves randomly, without regard to the location of the legitimate nodes. We will assume that the eavesdropper adopts random mobility unless otherwise stated.
Mobile Man in the Middle: Node e controls its mobility such that it can move accordingly to obtain a geographic advantage compared to legitimate nodes. We consider the strategy where node e moves to the midpoint of its maximum likelihood estimates of the legitimate nodes' locations. For j ∈ {1, 2}, let us denote node e's maximum likelihood estimate of node j's location at slot i based on its observations up to slot i − 1 as
In other words, node 1 and node 2's locations at slot i are predicated by node e by its observations in the previous slots. Then, at the beginning of each slot i, node e moves to the midpoint of the estimates, which is (l 1,e [i] +l 2,e [i])/2.
In this paper, we also discuss the implications of multiple and more capable eavesdroppers. The eavesdroppers may utilize their observations in two possible ways: 1) Noncolluding eavesdroppers do not communicate or share their observations with each other, whereas 2) colluding eavesdroppers combine their measurements to obtain less noisy measurements. The theoretical secret key capacity under the colluding eavesdropper scenario is lower, due to the cooperation of the eavesdroppers, as discussed in Section IV. An eavesdropper with multiple location sensors (e.g., multiple antennas in the case of wireless radio-based localization) is a special case of colluding eavesdroppers, as each sensor could be viewed as a separate eavesdropper, with perfect links between them. Theoretical bounds, considering a more capable eavesdropper with multiple location sensors, are evaluated numerically in Section V-C.
D. Notion of Security
We consider the typical definition of source model of information theoretic secrecy under a passive eavesdropper: We assume that there exists an authenticated error-free public channel, in which the legitimate nodes can communicate to agree on secret keys, based on the observations of the distances and angles (o 1 and o 2 ) obtained during beacon exchange. This process, commonly referred to as public discussion [1] , is a T step message exchange protocol, where, at any step 
At the end of the T step protocol, node 1 obtains k 1 , and node 2 obtains k 2 as the secret key, where
Definition 1: Secret key bits are generated (with respect to the described attacker model) at rate R if, for all > 0 and δ > 0, there exists some n, T > 0 such that (1)-(3) are satisfied, and
Here, (4)-(6) correspond to perfect randomness, reliability, and security constraints, respectively. The schemes proposed in the literature typically use a random coding structure, where
are generated by using a binning strategy [1]- [6] . In Section IV, we will make use of these existing results to provide computable theoretical bounds on the achievable key rates.
In practical scenarios, equivocation at e (6) is difficult to analyze, particularly at finite block lengths [32] . To that end, we consider an approximate version of Definition 1 in our key generation algorithm, which is explained in Section III-E.
III. KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we briefly explain our algorithm in five parts and provide the complete scheme in Algorithm 1. For guidance, the main steps are sketched in Fig. 3 for node 1. Prior to the first stage, one of the legitimate nodes is appointed to be the master node and is responsible for making several decisions. Let us assume that node 1 is the master node.
Algorithm 1 Key Generation From Localization
Step 0: Quantization
Step 1: Localization a: Beacon Exchange
Step 4: Privacy Amplification
A. Quantization
First, the nodes quantize the field L. Quantization is required for the nodes to efficiently calculate the location estimates and store them in their buffers for use in the subsequent public discussion phase. In our algorithm, we consider the uniform 2-D quantization function ψ, which is
B. Beacon Exchange and Localization
In this phase, the legitimate nodes localize to develop the common randomness which serves as the basis for key generation in the following steps. First, beacons are exchanged over n subsequent slots to form the observation vectors o 1 and o 2 as explained in Section II-B. Node e, on the other hand, overhears the beacons and obtains the observations o e .
Note that each observation vector o j [i] depends solely on the signals exchanged on slot i for all j ∈ {1, 2, e} and i ∈ {1 . . . n}. In the case where the statistics of the mobility is available at the nodes, each node can find the maximum likelihood estimatess Δ 1 ands Δ 2 of the quantized location triple
Note
, wherel Δ 1,j is node j's maximum likelihood estimate of the node 1 location vector. 3 The terms s Δ j are obtained efficiently by using the Viterbi algorithm as explained in our technical report [34] . Note the following.
1) For very small Δ, it is not computationally feasible to run the Viterbi algorithm since the quantized state size |S Δ | ∞ as Δ 0. 2) If mobility statistics is not available at the nodes, then the ML estimate of the node locations at a given slot depends solely on the observations on the particular slot. For these cases, we skip the Viterbi algorithm. For the perfect GLI, instead of (7), we usẽ
∀i. Note that, in perfect GLI, each node knows its global location:
On the other hand, for no GLI, the angle and global location observations are not available at the legitimate nodes. Hence, the nodes do not have any useful information about each other's 2-D location. Therefore, they only use their 1-D distance observations in the following public discussion stage, instead of their 2-D location estimates, i.e., we sets Δ 1 =d 1 ands Δ 1 =d 2 .
C. Binary Conversion and Public Discussion
First, each node j ∈ {1, 2} obtains an initial m bit binary sequence
where κ(·, m)
Gray coder, which maps the 2-D difference of location estimates to m bit binary sequences. Let v j = [v j [1] . . . v j [n]] represent the concatenated version of bit sequences, of size nm bits. Due to the noisy nature of the observations, the bit mismatch rate (BMR) between the sequences v 1 and v 2 , denoted as BMR(v 1 , v 2 ), can be significant. To correct bit mismatches, nodes 1 and 2 exchange T binary messages (C 1 [1] , . . . , C 1 [T ]) and (C 2 [1] , . . . , C 2 [T ]) over the public channel, to agree on almost identical initial keys u 1 and u 2 , respectively, such that
where δ > 0 can be chosen low enough such that the reliability constraint is satisfied. The process is referred to as information reconciliation by public discussion [1] . In our algorithm, we use the cascade reconciliation protocol [29] , which is covered in our technical report [34] . Cascade protocol performs efficiently when the BMR of the initial sequences is low enough such that [29] BMR
Parameter m is chosen as large as possible such that (10) is satisfied. On the other hand, T is variable and depends on bit sequences and intermediate cascade parameters, as explained in our technical report [34] .
D. Universal Compression
After the public discussion phase, we have satisfied the reliability constraint. However, we have yet to satisfy the randomness and secrecy constraints: Due to predictable mobility patterns of legitimate nodes, it is possible that v j , hence u j , may not be perfectly random. Furthermore, the eavesdropper obtains information correlated with u j due to two reasons: The eavesdropper's observations o e are correlated with the legitimate nodes' observations o 1 , o 2 , and the parity bits exchanged during the cascade protocol in the public discussion phase reveal some information about the keys u 1 and u 2 to the eavesdropper. Therefore, in the following two stages, we compress and hash the keys u 1 and u 2 to obtain smaller keys that satisfy randomness and secrecy constraints.
Legitimate nodes first compress their key sequences u 1 and u 2 using a universal compression function H c (·) to obtain
where the bit sequences q j are of size nR bits. In our algorithm, we use the deflate/inflate compression library for function H c (·) [30] . Let the compression ratio be denoted by α Δ = R /m.
E. Privacy Amplification
Legitimate nodes will map their compressed keys q 1 and q 2 into shorter sequences, k 1 and k 2 , of key bits in such a way that perfect secrecy condition (6) in Definition 1 is satisfied. We use the following universal hash function for privacy amplification.
where LSB nR is the least significant nR bits, a is an element over the binary Galois field GF(2 nR ), and x ∈ {0, 1} nR is interpreted as an element of GF(2 nR ) with respect to a fixed basis of the extension field over the prime field GF(2). Consequently, {H a (x)} a∈GF(2 nR ) is a universal class of hash functions [7] .
In the privacy amplification stage, node 1 first chooses a randomly and uniformly over GF (2 nR ) and broadcasts on the public channel. Then, nodes 1 and 2 apply privacy amplification k 1 = H a (q 1 , nR) and k 2 = H a (q 2 , nR), respectively.
Choice of Rate R: Due to the imperfections associated with quantization and cascade reconciliation protocol, rate R cannot be chosen to be the theoretical secret key capacity, which is studied in the following section. To satisfy the perfect secrecy condition (6) , it suffices to choose rate R as R < R * , where R * is the equivocation rate at node e [7] , [18] 
However, the calculation of (13) may be computationally infeasible, as discussed in [32] . In our technical report [34] , we approximate R * to obtaiñ
which is much easier to evaluate. Here, BMR e = nm i=1 1(v 1 [i] = v e [i])/nm is the BMR at node e before public discussion, assuming that node e follows quantization and localization steps as described for legitimate nodes and obtains initial bit sequence v e .
Note that BMR e is not perfectly available at the legitimate nodes since it requires the perfect knowledge of v e [i]. However, when the mobility, and observation noise statistics of the eavesdropper are available at the master node, BMR e can be approximated using Monte Carlo simulations. Note that this is a reasonable assumption, as security is generally defined with respect to a certain threat model. It even suffices if we do not know the exact statistics but only know the set of mobility/observation noise statistics that the eavesdropper belongs to (there is a compound nature of the eavesdropper model). For example, we can consider a variety of a class of attackers with distinct mobility patterns. Then, we can choosẽ R * to secure the keys with respect to the worst possible attacker. While one may think that it is not possible to generate a secret key at a nonzero rate with this conservative approach, our experimental observations presented in Section VI are highly encouraging.
IV. THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE LIMITS
In this section, we provide information theoretic bounds on the achievable key rate with perfect reliability. To evaluate these bounds, we assume an idealized system by ignoring the issues associated with quantization, cascade reconciliation protocol, and privacy amplification. Thus, these bounds are valid for any key generation scheme that satisfies Definition 1.
Theorem 1: A lower bound R L and an upper bound R U on the perfectly reliable key rate achievable through public discussion are
respectively, where o 1 , o 2 , and o e are as given in Table II for different possibilities of GLI.
The theorem follows 4 from [18, Proposition 7] , which generalizes Maurer's results on secret key generation through public discussion [1] to non-i.i.d. settings. Although tighter bounds exist in the literature [2] , [3] , we use the aforementioned bounds since they provide clearer insights due to their simplicity.
For the special case where observations
) are i.i.d., we can safely drop the index i and denote the joint probability density function of observations as f (o 1 , o 2 , o e ). Therefore, the conditioning on the past and future observations in R L and R U disappears, and the bounds reduce to
Also, note that Theorem 1 can be extended to provide key rate bounds against multiple eavesdropper models discussed in Section II-C. Consider K eavesdroppers, with observations o e,1 , . . . , o e,K . For the noncolluding eavesdropper model, since the eavesdroppers are not communicating, we can safely consider the most capable eavesdropper k. In other words, in (15) and (16), we can replace o e with o e,k for k ∈ {1, . . . K} which yields the lowest bounds and discard the rest of the eavesdroppers. For the colluding eavesdropper model, we can replace the term o e in (15) and (16) with o e,1 , . . . , o e,K since the eavesdroppers perfectly communicate with each other. It can be directly observed that the bounds for the colluding case are lower with respect to the noncolluding case.
V. GAUSSIAN OBSERVATIONS
To obtain more insights from theoretical results in Section IV, we focus on the following special case: First, we assume that the node locations are individually Markov processes such that
holds for any i and their joint probability density function f (l 1 , l 2 , l e ) is well defined. Second, all observations of distance and angle terms are i.i.d. Gaussian processes. This model is typically used in the literature to characterize the observation noise [8] , [19] . Using the insights, we develop our opportunistic beacon exchange algorithm and evaluate the theoretical bounds on a simple 2-D grid. To that end, for no GLI, j ∈ {1, 2}
are Gaussian noise processes, where P is the beacon power.
The observation noise variances are increasing functions of the distance, which are modeled by the increasing functions γ for distance observations and γ φ for angle observations. The parameter ρ j depends on the capability of the nodes. For instance, in wireless localization, γ and γ φ depend on the path-loss exponent, and ρ depends on the receiver antenna gain, number of antennas, etc. [8] , [19] . For perfect GLI, we additionally assume 5 
Clearly, the achievable key rates depend highly on the functions γ, γ φ , and ρ. In Section V-C, we evaluate the key rate performance of our algorithm for particular choices of γ, γ φ , and ρ and compare with the theoretical bounds in Section IV. We emphasize that our key generation algorithm works in the general case, without the aforementioned assumptions on the node locations following a Markov process and with the distance and angle observations being Gaussian, as illustrated in experimental results in Section VI. Note that there may be a bias on these observations due to small scale fading [19] . The effect of biased observations is considered in our technical report [34] .
A. Beacon Power Asymptotics
In this part, we analyze the beacon power asymptotics of the system. We show that, if the eavesdropper does not observe the angle, 6 i.e.,φ e = ∅, then R L increases unboundedly with the beacon power P , which indicates that arbitrarily large secret key rates can be obtained. However, when the eavesdropper observes the angle information, then R U remains bounded, which indicates that the advantage gained by increasing the beacon power is rather limited. To clearly illustrate our insights, we present our results for the no GLI scenario. However, the same conclusion holds for the perfect GLI case as well.
Note that transmitting multiple beacons at a given slot delivers the same effect as increasing the beacon power. Since the observation noise terms are i.i.d. Gaussian, the arithmetic mean of these observations at the receiver is a sufficient statistic. In other words, transmitting a single beacon at power KP is equivalent to transmitting K beacons at power P , for K ≥ 1.
Theorem 2: When the eavesdropper obtains the angle information, i.e., I(φ e ; φ e ) > 0
The proof is in Appendix B, where we show that
The parameter η remains finite since the distances take on values in some bounded range [d min , d max ] with probability 1. Therefore, the secret key rate remains bounded. The proof is provided in Appendix B. Theorem 3 implies that, without the angle observation at the eavesdropper, an arbitrarily large key rate can be achieved with sufficiently large beacon power P . However, the key rate increases with log(P ), which means that increasing the beacon power would provide diminishing returns.
B. Opportunistic Beacon Exchange Algorithm
Note that observation noise variance terms (19) 
holds for j ∈ {1, 2}, the transmission at slot i benefits the eavesdropper more than it benefits the legitimate nodes. This is due to the fact that, since node locations are not independent across time, the eavesdropper can use the advantage obtained at slot i to obtain better estimates at slot i + 1. Therefore, skipping the beacon transmission at slots when condition (26) occurs will yield higher key rates compared to the case where a beacon is exchanged in every slot. However, it is not feasible for legitimate nodes to verify condition (26) due to the following two facts.
1) It is not computationally feasible to verify condition (26) .
2) The legitimate nodes do not know each other's exact location, and they do not observe the eavesdropper's location at all.
To circumvent these two issues, we consider an approximate version of (26) and consider the likelihood of that new condition, based on the nodes' statistical knowledge of each other's and the eavesdropper's location. The details are provided in Algorithm 2. Beacon transmission decisions are made by the master node. Let
where ρ max = max(ρ 1 , ρ 2 ). The master node decides to skip the beacon exchange at slot i either when the condition (29) occurs for some predetermined threshold τ and when a beacon exchange has occurred in the previous c slots, chosen appropriately in order to avoid long droughts leading to the possibility for the nodes to get out of each other's range. The derivation of (29) follows from applying a series of linear approximations to (26) 
If the other legitimate node receives a beacon during slot i, it replies back with a beacon; otherwise, it remains silent. At the end of slot i, the nodes update their observations such that, if no beacons have been transmitted, then o j [i] = ∅ for j ∈ {1, 2, e}. The probability in (29) can be efficiently approximated with linear complexity using the forward algorithm, as provided in Algorithm 2 and illustrated in Appendix A-1.
Remarks:
• If the mobility is i.i.d., then no advantage in terms of secret key rate can be obtained by using opportunistic beacon transmission. Still, power would be more efficiently utilized due to less beacon exchanges. • The algorithm works when the statistical knowledge of eavesdropper mobility is available at the legitimate nodes. Despite the fact that the eavesdropper is passive, it is reasonable to assume certain mobility models under specific settings (e.g., vehicular applications). In Section V-C, we show that our algorithm achieves nonzero secret key rates for some cases that yield zero secrecy rates when a beacon is transmitted every time slot. We also compare our algorithm with the genie-aided case, in which a genie knows the exact locations of all the nodes in the field and tells the nodes to skip beacon transmission at slot i when the condition
is satisfied. The genie-aided case provides us an upper bound on the achievable key rate among algorithms that use this condition for beacon transmission decisions.
C. Numerical Evaluations
We evaluate the key rate performance of our key generation algorithm and the theoretical bounds in Section IV for the Gaussian observations model using Monte Carlo simulations. We also study the theoretical performance gains of the proposed opportunistic beacon exchange strategy.
Setup: We consider a simple (M ×M ) discrete 2-D grid, which simulates a city with M blocks that covers a square field of area A 2 , such that, for any j ∈ {1, 2, e}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, l 
For no GLI, we choose γ(d) = 0.1 + d 2 and γ φ (d 1e , d 2e ) = π − (π/(1.1 + (d 2 1e + d 2 2e ))), and for perfect GLI, we choose γ φ (d je ) = π − (π/(1. 1 + d 2 je )) such that both parameters are strictly increasing functions of the distances. 7 We assume that nodes employ identical location sensors, and the observation variance term is a function of the number of sensors: Since the observation noise in different sensors is i.i.d. Gaussian, the maximum ratio combining yields a single less noisy Gaussian observation such that ρ 1 = 1/ √ K 1 , where K 1 is the number of sensors in node 1, and we similarly define ρ 2 , ρ e . We consider identical nodes (ρ 1 = ρ 2 = ρ e = 1) unless stated otherwise. The theoretical key rates are calculated using the forward algorithm procedure described in our technical report [34] .
Results: Due to computational limitations explained in Section III-B, we consider examples in which M ≤ 11 and B ≤ 3. Note that this choice limits the maximum achievable secret key rate. 8 First, we compare the performance of our key generation algorithm with the theoretical capacity bounds in Section IV. Recall that the theoretical lower bound R L is achieved by using random coding arguments which are not feasible to implement due to computational complexity. Therefore, our algorithm is expected to perform worse than R L since it is implemented using computationally efficient tools, such as the Viterbi algorithm, cascade algorithm, etc. In Fig. 4 , we plot the key rates with respect to the normalized beacon power P/σ 2 0 for M = 5, A = 5, and B = 1, where σ 2 0 denotes the variance of distance observationsd j [i] of legitimate nodes at unit distance. We show that, even in this grid with a small number of possible locations, we can generate reliable key bits comparable with R L . The key rate starts to decrease at a certain beacon power, 7 A similar model for distance observation noise is used in [8] . Since φe ∈ [0, π], the angle observation error variance cannot diverge with distance, and we upper bounded the variance term by π/1.1. To avoid zero error variances at zero distance, we introduce a 0.1 offset to the numerator and denominator of γ and γ φ , respectively. 8 For instance, for B = 1, there are 13 different possible distance combinations. Consequently, a key rate of log 13 is an absolute upper bound for no GLI, even in the case when the eavesdropper obtains no observation. beyond which the rate of information accumulation at the eavesdropper exceeds that at the legitimate nodes.
Then, we analyze the effect of grid size, field area, and GLI on the theoretical key rates. In Figs. 5 and 6 , we plot the bounds on the achievable key rate with respect to the normalized beacon power P/σ 2 0 for different grid size M for no GLI and perfect GLI cases, respectively. We assumed a constant ratio of field size and grid size, A/M = 1, and considered B = 1. We can see that there is a diminishing return on the increased power levels for the achievable key rate. Furthermore, we can see that increasing the field area A 2 has a negative impact on the key rate despite the increase in M , which is due to the fact that the common information of the legitimate nodes decreases as a result of the increase in their observation error variance.
We also study a more capable eavesdropper with multiple sensors (antennas), where the observations in each sensor are combined to obtain less-noisy observations via maximum ratio combining. In Fig. 7 , we plot the theoretical bounds, where we assume no GLI for all nodes, and the legitimate nodes have a single sensor (ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 1), M = 5, A = 5, and B = 1. It is observed that the achievable rate remains positive, even with a slightly more capable eavesdropper.
Next, we show that, for an even more pessimistic scenario, positive key rates can be achieved by our opportunistic scheme, which would not be possible with the nonopportunistic case. We assume the following: 1) Node e has three location sensors compared to the single sensor in the legitimate nodes (ρ e ≈ 0.6), 2) node e has perfect GLI, whereas the legitimate nodes have no GLI; and 3) node e stays fixed at the center of the M × M grid for M = 7, A = 5, and B = 1. Since the observation noise variance is an increasing function of the distance, this also gives node e a geographic advantage over the legitimate nodes 1 and 2. We can see from Fig. 8 that the secret key rate decays to 0 with the nonopportunistic scheme. On the other hand, nonzero secret key rates can be achieved with our opportunistic strategy outlined in Section III, for parameters τ = 0.5 and c = 4. On the same figure, we also plot the achievable key rates for the genie-aided scheme, which has the reach to the perfect side information on whether the legitimate nodes have a geograph- ical advantage or not at any given point in time. With such side information, the key rate is roughly doubled compared to our opportunistic scheme. Note that our algorithm obtains information on the presence of a geographical advantage, based solely on the beacon observations.
Assuming that node e has perfect GLI and legitimate nodes have no GLI, we analyze the effect of eavesdropper mobility on the achievable key rate. In Fig. 9 , for M = 7, A = 5, and B = 1, we plot the secret key rate bounds for the cases where node e does the following: 1) follows the random mobility pattern described in the setup with parameter B = 1, 2) stays at the origin, and 3) follows the man-in-the-middle strategy described in Section II-C. We can see that, compared to following a random mobility pattern, the eavesdropper can reduce the achievable secret key rate significantly by following this strategy. The eavesdropper can also reduce the key rate by simply staying static at a certain favorable location, rather than moving randomly. However, in practice, this may not be feasible since, by staying put, it will lose connection with the legitimate nodes in a large region. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
To illustrate that our algorithm can be implemented in practice, we test our key generation algorithm in a vehicular setting with wireless radios. We used two vehicles A and B, each equipped with TelosB motes. Omnidirectional antennas placed above wheels of each vehicle, as shown in Fig. 10 , are connected to TelosB motes. Beacons are transmitted from antennas periodically, and RSSI measurements are collected for transmitter-receiver antenna pairs, which are mapped to obtain distance observations using a path-loss model.
We chose to utilize long term-averaged RSSI as the source of distance observations because we want to illustrate that our algorithm can be easily implemented in practice using on-theshelf devices. Note that RSSI can be easily obtained from higher layers, without any modification on the physical layer. It is clear that the success of a scheme that utilizes RSSIs is dependent on channel reciprocity, and this approach, at first glance, seems similar to works on channel reciprocity [20] - [25] . Our main differences from these works are the following: 1) We utilize long term-averaged RSSI and hence eliminate the fluctuations in RSSI due to fading and shadowing, which are the main sources of keys generated via channel reciprocity approaches; and 2) we can explicitly calculate the equivocation rate and hence obtain perfectly secure key bits, without encountering secrecy outages.
We use the rear left antenna of vehicle A and the front left antenna of vehicle B as nodes 1 and 2, respectively. Similarly, we take the measurements from the rear right antenna of vehicle A to be the eavesdropper observations. Note that, in this case, the distance between node 1 and node e is fixed and we assume that this distance d 1e and the angle φ e are known perfectly by node e. We also assume that nodes 1 and 2 do not have the mobility statistics or their individual global locations (hence no GLI). Thus, the scenario that we are trying to emulate with this experiment is one that is extremely favorable for the eavesdropper (an attacker that collects observations directly from one of the legitimate vehicles). We illustrate that, even in such highly pessimistic cases, it is possible to generate secret keys at a nonzero rate.
Our key generation algorithm has been tested on vehicles driven in the following: 1) freeway and 2) local roads, where beacon exchange occurs roughly every second. For both settings, we utilized the following: 1) sedan and 2) Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV)-type. For sedan vehicles, we were also able to test our algorithm under heavier traffic conditions, during the busy hours. The achieved key rates, in terms of bits per second, are provided in Table III . As expected, key rates achieved under heavier traffic conditions are lower compared to lighter traffic conditions, due to multipath and non-line-of-sight effects from the physically interfering cars. Due to similar reasons, we also see that key rates achieved in freeway roads are consistently higher compared to local roads.
We go over the details of our key generation algorithm for sedan-freeway setting and consider the first n = 1000 slots. We use a path-loss model to obtain distance observations 9 from long term-averaged beacon RSSI [31] d j [i] = −22 log 10 (0.1RSSI j [i]+0.9RSSI j [i−1])−44. 8 (30) where RSSI j [i] is associated with node j at measurement slot i (the unit is dBm) andd j [i] is the distance measurement in meters. Note that the operation inside the parenthesis in (30) provides the exponential moving average of RSSI measurements, where the weights are chosen sufficiently large to eliminate the fluctuations in RSSI due to fading and shadowing. The distance measurementsd 1 ,d 2 at the legitimate nodes and d 2e at node e, each of size n-samples, are provided in Fig. 11 . Recall that d 1e and φ e are known perfectly at the eavesdropper.
Recall from Section III-B that, in case of the lack of mobility statistics and GLI at the legitimate nodes, we generate keys based on 1-D relative distance information, instead of 2-D relative location information. Therefore, we skip the Viterbi algorithm and consider the m-bit quantization function, and we use an m-bit Gray coder to obtain the initial binary sequences v 1 , v 2 , and v e , each of size nm bits. As discussed in Section III-C, we choose m to be the largest possible value that satisfies (10) , which turns out to be m = 2 for the sedan-freeway experiment. In Fig. 12 , we provide v 1 , along with the bit mismatches in node 2, i.e., (v 1 ⊕ v 2 ), and the bit mismatches in node e, i.e., (v 1 ⊕ v e ) before information reconciliation. The BMRs are (BMR(v 1 , v 2 )) = 0.0935 and (BMR(v 1 , v e )) = 0.4095. Then, we use the cascade reconciliation protocol to correct bit mismatches at node 2. The legitimate nodes obtain u 1 and u 2 , where bit mismatches (u 1 ⊕ u 2 ) at the legitimate node 2 are shown in Fig. 12 , The bit mismatches at legitimate nodes are almost completely corrected during reconciliation, as (BMR(u 1 , u 2 )) = 0.001. However, T = 1301 message bits are exchanged each way on the public channel and revealed to node e. Finally, the legitimate nodes compress their bit sequences u 1 and u 2 using universal compression to obtain compressed sequences q 1 and q 2 , each of size 1248 bits, and hence, the compression ratio is α = 0.624. Finally, the legitimate nodes apply privacy amplification to the compressed sequences to obtain shorter messages k 1 and k 2 of size nR. Choosing R = 0.4065 bits/slot is sufficient for perfect secrecy, according to (14) , which corresponds to 0.4065 bits/second since a sample is acquired in each slot. Note that this rate can be increased by taking observations more frequently. In Table IV , we provide the results of the NIST randomness tests applied to key sequence k 1 . Here, a value greater than 0.01 is considered as a pass [28] . It can be observed that k 1 passes all the randomness tests.
VII. CONCLUSION
We showed, through both practical and theoretical analyses, that relative localization information is an additional resource for generating secret key bits in mobile networks. To illustrate practical feasibility, we developed an algorithm using computationally efficient tools, which works in three main steps: localization, public discussion, and privacy amplification. We also studied the information theoretic limits of secret key generation and characterized lower and upper bounds of key rates, utilizing results for the cases in which the nodes are/are not capable of observing their global locations. Focusing on the special case where the observation noise is i.i.d. Gaussian, we studied the beacon power asymptotics and observed that, when the eavesdropper cannot observe the angle information, the secret key rate grows unboundedly. Via our novel opportunistic beacon exchange algorithm, we illustrated that nonzero secret key rates are achievable even when the eavesdropper is more capable on average. We also tested our algorithm on a vehicular setting and showed that our algorithm can be implemented using on-theshelf devices, without any modification on the physical layer. We showed that nonzero key rates are achievable in practice, even under extremely pessimistic settings. The following research directions can be further investigated: 1) performance analysis of secret key generation in large networks, taking into account the recent advances in network information theoretic security; and 2) security analysis of various adversarial models, such as jamming attacks or impersonation attacks in unauthenticated networks.
APPENDIX A ON OPPORTUNISTIC BEACON EXCHANGE
We do not directly use (26) for beacon transmission decisions due to certain challenges. Here, we address them and justify why we use (29) instead. The first issue is that it is difficult to verify condition (26) . To see whether there exists a valid probability density functionf that satisfies (26), we can pose the problem as that of calculus of variations: 
would be sufficient to verify that the actual node measurement is more degraded than the eavesdropper measurement. 10 Note that the legitimate nodes cannot make use of (33) for beacon transmission decisions directly since they only have the statistics of the eavesdropper location and they do not know the parameters 
APPENDIX B PROOFS OF THEOREMS IN SECTION V-A
A. Proof of Theorem 2
We provide three lemmas that will be useful in the proof. 
The proofs of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 are provided in our technical report [34] due to space constraints. Assume, without loss of generality, that ρ min = min(ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = ρ 1 . Whenφ e = ∅ 
Then
Note that, for a given variance, Gaussian distribution maximizes the entropy. Therefore, the entropy of a Gaussian random variable that has a variance identical to that ofd 1 −d e will be an upper bound for (39). We proceed as follows:
where (40) where (45) follows from the fact that, since w φ e is zero mean Gaussian, |w φ e | follows a half-normal distribution with E(|w φ e |) = 2γ φ (d 1e , d 2e )ρ e /P π. We can choose P 1 such that, for any beacon power P > P 1 , E[κ] > − (3/4 
where (53) follows from (37) and (39), and (54) follows from the fact that the entropy ofd 1 −d e is upper bounded by the entropy of a Gaussian random variable with the same variance. The first term of (55) is obtained by combining (42), (48), and (52), and the second term of (55) follows from (38). As P → ∞, the P terms in (55) cancel each other since, for any random variables u and v
hence, lim P →∞ R U < ∞.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
When the eavesdropper does not observe the angle,φ e = ∅. Hence
First, we show that the first term in (56) therefore, lim P →∞ (R U /(1/2) log(P )) ≤ 1. Since R L ≤ R U by definition, the proof is complete.
